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SUDAN’S POWER STRUGGLE MATTERS WELL BEYOND ITS BORDERS |
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The MED This Week newsletter provides expert analysis and informed comments on the MENA region’s most significant issues and trends. Today we focus on Sudan, where the violent clashes between two rival factions has thrown the country into one of the worst crises in its recent history, with several implications for the region.
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Violence in Sudan continues to rage and likely
won’t abate. Since
April 13, the country has been turning into a battleground for rival armed
factions. The Sudanese Army on one side – led
by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan – and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on
the other – the powerful paramilitary group headed by General Mohamed Hamdan
Dagalo ("Hemedti") – are locked in an open conflict throughout the
country. Internally, the crisis could jeopardize the transition from
military rule to a civilian-led democracy. However, it also has the
potential to further undermine regional stability and compromise the interests of
neighbouring countries. Given their substantial economic support to the
Burhan-Hemedti interim government, Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and
the UAE are now pressuring both sides to adopt a diplomatic solution that
could protect their long-term strategic interests in the African country. For Egypt
and Türkiye, a full-fledged civil war in Sudan would represent a significant
threat to their presence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa – especially for
the Cairo-led front against Ethiopia's Great Renaissance Dam. Lastly, Russia,
which has links with both factions, is becoming an increasingly influential player
in Sudan, as shown by Moscow's attempts (usually spearheaded by the Wagner
paramilitary group) to access Sudan's Red Sea ports and mineral resources.
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Experts of the ISPI MED network react to the domestic and regional implications of the ongoing clash between Sudan’s top military leaders. |
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The clashes reinforce the militarisation of Sudan’s politics: large-scale instability is behind the corner
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“The ongoing crisis is the latest challenge faced by
Sudan in the complex transition that started with the ousting of Omar al-Bashir
in 2019. This transition was already hampered by the dominance of military
actors interested in preserving the status quo (army and RSF) against civilian
actors pushing for structural change (Sudan’s strong nonviolent protest
movement). These recent clashes risk further marginalising the civilian actors,
reinforcing the militarisation of Sudanese politics, and heightening the risk
of conflict and instability. Moreover, while the conflict has so far for the
most part played out between the army and the RSF, there is a risk that it may
spread to other groups, potentially resulting in the mobilisation of certain segments
of the population based on their ethnicity. This could drastically escalate the
conflict and should be avoided at all costs.”
Guido Lanfranchi, Junior Research Fellow, Conflict
Research Unit (CRU), Clingendael
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Despite international appeals for a resolution, the situation on the ground offers no room for mediation
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“The recent flare-up of violence represents a dramatic chapter for a
country that, four years after the fall of al-Bashir's 30 year-long regime, is
still striving for its democratic transition. After five days, and despite
multiple ceasefire attempts, the conflict between al-Burhan's and Hemedti's
forces does not seem to be abating. While external partners and international
institutions call for a resolution of the crisis, the spiral of violence is
worsening by the day, conjuring up the ghosts of a civil war. External
mediation, such as those proposed by regional leaders, could help stop the
violence and give the population a lull, but it is hampered by violence on the
ground, which seems to be affecting even humanitarian organisations. Every
effort is needed to prevent the country from slipping into a chronic conflict
and to patch up a political process that is now more dramatic and difficult
than ever.”
Lucia Ragazzi,
Research Fellow, Africa Programme, ISPI
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A weak and unstable Sudan opposes Cairo’s regional interests
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“The ongoing clashes in Sudan do not serve
Egypt’s interests because they foment instability on its southern border. They
weaken Sudan’s security institutions and the ability for the Sudanese state to
control its borders and regions. The clashes also limit Egypt’s ability to
count on Sudan’s support and assistance in dealing with the serious issue of
Ethiopia’s Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which negatively affects water
supplies that they both rely on. With Sudan in chaos, the two cannot form a
unified front against Ethiopia. Regionally, the clashes put Egypt in a bind. On the one hand, it supports Sovereign
Council leader Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan; on the other, Rapid Support Forces
commander Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo gets his support mainly from the UAE and Saudi
Arabia, two states that Egypt relies on for financial aid during these very
difficult economic times.”
Imad K. Harb, Director of Research and Analysis, Arab
Center Washington DC
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Sudan’s Gulf patrons should exert their influence to bring both sides to the negotiation table
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“While the UAE and Saudi Arabia have become the
most important external patrons in Sudan since the coup in 2019, the UAE has recently
become a far more influential player in Sudan. Through its network-centric
statecraft, Abu Dhabi has successfully created strong interdependencies across
Sudan's socio-political and economic spectrum. While the current clashes
undermine the Emirati and Saudi narrative of ‘authoritarian stability’
delivered by strongmen in uniform, the UAE have a variety of nodes and layers
in their engagement with Sudan that are sustainable regardless of the political
instability. Abu Dhabi should use these networks, especially around Hemedti, to
pressure the warlord to return to the negotiation table and ensure these
clashes do not lead to a civil war. The more Hemedti feels empowered, the less
controllable he will become, and the more the UAE will risk losing its
influence.”
Andreas Krieg, Senior Lecturer, School of Security Studies,
King’s College London; and Fellow, Institute of Middle Eastern Studies
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Ankara’s “wait-and-see approach” to Sudanese politics
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“Following the backlashes of al-Bashir's
overthrow, with whom Türkiye had strengthened relations, Ankara adopted a
wait-and-see approach to Sudanese politics. Due to the recent détente with UAE,
Egypt, and KSA, Türkiye has gradually improved its relations with Khartoum, utilising
its traditional foreign policy tools such as public diplomacy (schools,
language courses, TV series) and business (agriculture, construction). Türkiye
has kept an equidistant posture between al-Burhan and Hemedti to preserve its
interests. At the same time, it has maintained open channels with the civil
society. Therefore, Türkiye does not have much to lose in the ongoing conflict.
Instead, Ankara could capitalize on its low-profile policy and neutral stance
when the situation should normalize.”
Federico Donelli, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Trieste
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Russia’s shadow looms over the crisis in Sudan
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“The ongoing crisis in Sudan has significant
regional and international implications. The escalating violence, driven by
long-developing dynamics and a power struggle between rival armed factions such
as Hemedti's opposition to the military-civilian power transition and the
Sudanese Army led by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, could be seen as a direct
power struggle within the country. However, it also places Sudan at the centre
of divisive global geopolitical disputes. Russia plays a prominent role in
Sudan today. The presence of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military
organisation, in Sudanese gold mines and the recent
confirmation of a Russian naval base in the Port of Sudan, highlights Moscow's
growing influence. Meanwhile, Sudan balances the West and Russia's interests to
maintain internal political stability.”
Gustavo de Carvalho, Senior Researcher, African
Governance and Diplomacy Programme, SAIIA
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ISPI - Italian Institute for International Political Studies Subscribe to the MED Newsletter
MED – MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUES is the annual high-level
initiative promoted by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation and ISPI (Italian Institute for International
Political Studies) in Rome with the aim to rethink traditional approaches to
the area complementing analyses of current challenges with new ideas and
suggestions and to draft a new “positive agenda”, addressing shared
challenges at both the regional and the international level. The opinions expressed in this newsletter are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and ISPI.
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